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Abstract
Credit quality has long been associated with the level of indebtedness. But the sole fact that there are countries
with high creditworthiness and large stocks of debt suggests that indebtedness is just one of many factors which
determine credit quality. In this paper we investigate the role that economic fundamentals have on risk perception of
public debt, through both direct and indirect effects. Countries are grouped into four clusters, each corresponding to
a different stage of development in their economic fundamentals. We find that the effect of the debt burden on credit
quality is conditional on the current level of economic fundamentals and the degree to which they are improving.
A transition to stronger fundamentals would require moving to a better cluster but would ease pressure on any debt
adjustment necessary to improve creditworthiness. Consequently, there are two types of approaches countries in
CAPDR could focus on to improve credit quality. On the one hand, there are a set of actions which could be carried
out in the short run to move within a particular group or cluster-fiscal toolkit. On the other hand, there are actions,
which in the medium term may enable a country to transition to a group with better credit perception -structural
changes.
Introduction
During the years prior to the international financial crisis of 2008-09, the countries of Central America, Panama and
Dominican Republic (from here on, CAPDR or the region) conducted processes of fiscal consolidation, which enabled
them to reduce their levels of public debt and create some room for fiscal maneuver. This allowed the authorities
to carry out an expansionary fiscal policy to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. However, the increase in
spending in response to the crisis was biased toward rigid current spending in the majority of countries of the region.1
This dynamic, combined with a reduction in tax revenues, produced persistent fiscal deficits from 2009 onward, and,
consequently, significant growth in public debt.
The new fiscal context may increase the region's vulnerabilities. Firstly, the continuous debt growth, without clear
signs of fiscal consolidation, and given the lack of reforms to rebuild fiscal space to withstand future crises, has caused
investors to increase their perception of risk in the region. This dynamic could raise financing costs and limit access to
the international resources needed to resolve the social and productive investment gaps the region faces. Furthermore,
it reduces the ability to respond to a new economic downturn.
*This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of either the IDB or Boston University. The views expressed in this
Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IDB or Boston University. Working Papers are published to
elicit comments and to further debate. Corresponding author Guillermo LaGarda (glagarda@iadb.org)
1Macroeconomic Report for CAPDR, Interamerican Development Bank 2013, Izquierdo et al. (2013)
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Given the above, this paper investigates the relationship between the debt levels and credit ratings of the region by
identifying the factors affecting this relationship. The literature has explored to some extent the relation between debt
and creditworthiness (Reinhart et al., 2003), Bannister and Barrot (2011)). However, there is no detailed analysis of
institutional, financial, and productive factors that may also play a key role. We therefore contribute to the literature
by incorporating into the analysis a set of factors that explain why some countries should work harder at improving
their creditworthiness - a phenomenon known as debt intolerance.2
To pursue the above, we used a comprehensive cross-country data set covering from 1990 to 2015 and estimated
a set of dynamic panel regressions. Unlike other methodologies in the literature, we divided the sample into clusters
characterized by economic fundamentals and we discuss the effect of potential non-linearities. Our results suggest
two types of policy measures for CAPDR countries: First, it is reasonable to begin with quick gains on the fiscal
side, given the greater return they generate on credit perception and their immediate impact. This type of fiscal action
could also build confidence to facilitate subsequent areas of change in the longer term. However, it is important not
to neglect measures specifically aimed at improving medium and long-term fundamentals, which could have positive
short-term effects through their impact on expectations. That is, we present evidence of the desirability for CAPDR
countries to simultaneously emphasize progress in debt reduction policies and improvements in institutional quality,
the productive structure and the financial sector.
Second, the successful implementation of a program of fiscal and more structural measures could, after a time,
enable the country to graduate from a particular type of cluster. In any case, countries of the region would most likely
need to raise their creditworthiness from their current level in order to shift to a better composition of fundamentals.
In return, governments would be able to achieve larger fiscal space at a lower cost in periods of consolidation and, at
times of crisis, they would enjoy greater flexibility of response.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by describing the data and extract some stylized facts. The
latter is followed by a discussion of the methodology and the estimation results. Then, in the context of our findings
we discuss a pending agenda for CAPDR. In the last section we present some concluding remarks.
Related Literature
The debt intolerance approach originally discussed in Reinhart et al. (2003) pioneered research aimed at explaining
the relation between indebtedness and resilience to shocks. To approach this they used the external balance as a
performance indicator and tested their outcomes with different controls, including external debt. Their empirical
approach contrasted the Institutional Investor Rating (IIR), their proxy for creditworthiness, on a number of indicators
that may be behind debt intolerance, including the debt ratio and the history of inflation and default, to find the marginal
effect of an additional unit of debt on the IIR and hence on debt intolerance. This approach proved to be a practical
tool as a number of studies including Gabriel (2008), Topalova and Nyberg (2010) have used this approach to address
the questions regarding debt thresholds or develop debt targets for countries. Others such as Cecchetti et al. (2011)
based on their empirical estimations test indebtedness levels to identify after what particular level debt could become
harmful to economic growth (30-40% of GDP for developing countries). Baum et al. (2013) find non-linear effects on
growth especially when debt surpasses the 95% of GDP ratio.
A strand of research, closely related to the issue of threshold effects and economic growth, is that of debt sustain-
ability and identifying a maximum sustainable debt ratio. In fact it can be argued that the existence of a debt threshold
as it pertains to growth would imply that this is the point beyond which debt become unsustainable. Fund (2003) ad-
dressed this issue using a number of interesting approaches. First they estimated fiscal policy reaction functions, where
a positive response of the primary balance to debt indicates that the policy stance will allow for long-run solvency.
They found that for emerging economies the response of the primary balance stops when debt surpasses 50 percent
2(Reinhart et al., 2003)
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of GDP, compared to a threshold of 80 percent for industrial countries. The paper also employed a methodology that
seeks to determine whether a government is “over borrowing”, that is, if the existing debt stock is more than the present
discounted value of future primary balances. Assuming that the past is the best indicator of future policy action, the
average of historical primary balances was used as an estimate of expected primary balances, so that a benchmark
debt-to-GDP ratio could be calculated. This benchmark level was found to be 25 percent for emerging markets and
75 percent for industrial economies. Finally, the paper considers uncertainties governments may face, in particular
with respect to revenues earned; variability in revenues – especially when revenues are low for a long period – can
impact debt sustainability. Fund (2003) conducted simulations for ‘typical’ emerging market and industrial countries
and found that countries with a lower and more volatile revenue base, less ability to adjust expenditures, as well as
greater disparity between the real interest and growth rates, are able to sustain lower debt levels. As with the other
approaches used, it was found that emerging economies are able to sustain a lower ratio than more advanced countries.
However, rather than relating to growth and debt thresholds, our investigation orbits around credit quality and
debt. Usually research covering creditworthiness or ratings seek to explain what factors surrounding debt issuance
have more weight on credit rankings. Cantor and Packer (1996) documented one of the oldest exercises to address
this question. Their main finding is that both fiscal and external balances are not statistically significant to explain
credit ratings. Teker et al. (2013) discuss also the role of institutions. They find that changes in the legal environment
have three times more effect on credit ratings. Jaramillo and Tejada (2011) seek evidence supporting the convenience
of acquiring investment grade. They find that spreads are 36% lower once a country moves to an investment grade
position positively correlated with macroeconomic performance and global economic performance. Similar analysis
and conclusions are found in Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al. (2006), Sy (2002), or Afonso et al. (2011). Our approach
is to some extent complementary to these branches of literature as we try to link the correlation between fundamentals
and debt tolerance to a story of transition from lower to higher debt tolerance.
Finally, as Bannister and Barrot (2011) we address some of the methodological issues found in the debt intolerance
literature. In particular, we employ a dynamic panel approach, account for endogeneity in the regressors, and base the
selection of clusters on a dissimilarity criterion for economic fundamentals. Also, to our knowledge, Bannister and
Barrot (2011) and us, are the only few to discuss the findings in the context of the CAPDR economies.
What We Learned From the Data
Traditionally, it has been thought that lower levels of indebtedness in an economy are associated with a better risk
rating in financial markets, as less debt is associated with greater public sector capacity to meet obligations. However,
several studies have found that this negative correlation does not always hold, and that these ratings in fact depend on a
large number of factors. So what does the data tell us about creditworthiness? To answer this question, in this section
we explore the data from several angles that will provide us with a better understanding about the relationship between
credit quality and debt. First, we focus on searching for patterns among countries that may allow us to group them into
clusters. Next, we seek if among them, there are statistically significant differences in their economic fundamentals.
The section ends with a brief discussion of some trends we observed from other countries of Latin America.
Clusters
To approximate credit quality we use the Institutional Investor Rating (IIR).3 As shown in Figure 1, this indicator has
a high correlation with the risk ratings published by agencies such as Moody’s. Examining the relationship between
the IIR and the stock of debt for a sample of 104 countries between 1989 and 2015, it can be seen that the relationship
3The IIR is an index constructed by Institutional Investor Magazine from semi-annual surveys of economists and sovereign risk analysts from
different institutions that assign a score between 1 and 100 per country in accordance with the perceived probability of cessation of payments. The
valuations are weighted according to their participating institution’s global exposure.
3
Figure 1: The IIR And Credit Ratings
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a given level of public debt (or its debt tolerance) is explained by diﬀerences in the economy’s 
structural variables, such as per capita income and credit and inflation history. This analytical 
framework seeks to clarify why economies such as Japan enjoy lower financing costs despite 
having a debt-to-gdp ratio in excess of 200%, while others, with a much lower debt burden, 
have to pay higher interest rates. 
In this chapter the Institutional Investor Rating (IIR)2 is used as a proxy for credit quality, 
given that it has a high correlation with the risk ratings published by ratings agencies such as 
Moody’s (see Graph 2.1). Examining the re-
lationship between the IIR and the stock of 
debt for a sample of 104 countries between 
1989 and 2013, it can be seen that the rela-
tionship between these variables is not uni-
form (see Graph 2.2). 
Which are the characteristics, beyond 
the level of debt, that explain the diﬀer-
ences in the credit perception? To answer 
this question, the sample is first divided into 
groups (or clusters) based on debt levels 
and credit ratings. At the same time other 
variables, such as institutional strength,3 
GRAPH 2.1 The IIR And Credit Ratings
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
10
20
0
Ca
a3
Ca
a2
Ca
a1 B3 B2 B1 Ba
3
Moody’s Rating
IIR
Ba
2
Ba
1
Ba
a3
Ba
a2
Ca
a1 A3 A2 A1 Aa
3
Aa
2
Aa
1
Aa
a
Source: IDB staﬀ based on debt data for each country and Institutional 
Investor Magazine.
GRAPH 2.2 Apparent Inverse Relationship and Regions 1989–2013
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2 The IIR is an index constructed by Institutional Investor Magazine from semi-annual surveys of economists 
and sovereign risk analysts from diﬀerent institutions that assign a score of between 1 and 100 per country 
in accordance with the perceived probability of cessation of payments. The valuations are weighted accord-
ing to their participating institution’s global exposure.
3 Measured by the control of corruption index from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators.
between these variables is not uniform (Figure 2). We draw 4 hypothetical locus to point out some peculiarities: First,
there seems to be a horizontal ”U” shaped pattern where high-debt countries keep either very high or very low credit
quality. So what are the characteristics, beyond the level of debt, that explain the differences in credit perception?
Figure 2: Apparent ”Horizontal U-Shaped” Pattern, Sample 1989-2013
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To answer this question, we first try to find some patterns that may be compatible with our previous hypothetical
grouping. We therefore use a clustering criterion which specifies the dissimilarity of economic variables as a function
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of the pairwise distances of observations in sets.4 Figure 3 plots them for the 2013-2015 period and Figure 4 presents
the basic statistics of each group.5
Some results extracted from each cluster include:
i. Countries with high levels of debt as a percentage of GDP (74%) and low credit rankings. Egypt, Vietnam,
Nicaragua and Belize6 are some of the countries belonging to this group.
ii. Countries with average credit ratings and lower levels of debt (averaging 34%of GDP). Paraguay, Bulgaria,
Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Dominican Republic belong to this group.
iii. Countries with high credit ratings and low levels of debt (30% of GDP, on average). Emerging economies such
as Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Panama and Costa Rica belong to this group.
iv. Countries with solid economic fundamentals (low levels of inflation, good credit history and high per capita
income) with a good credit rating but with high levels of debt (equivalent to 76% of GDP, on average). The United
States and United Kingdom belong to this group.
Figure 3: Clusters, Sample 2013-2015
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Role of Fundamentals
Are fundamentals significantly different between clusters? To answer this we hypothesize the opposite and perform
t-test on mean differences. We want to know if, under the null hypothesis, the difference between sample means is
unlikely to be as large as the observed difference in our particular sample, that is
Ho = mf,i −mf,j = 0, (1)
where mf,i corresponds to the observed mean of fundamental f in cluster i and j, respectively.
We consider variables, such as institutional strength,7 productive structure,8 income,9 financial development,10
as well as their history of inflation and bankruptcy are examined to approximate economic fundamentals in various
dimensions. Figure 4 illustrates the relative difference between groups and clusters in terms of the economic funda-
mentals.11
4For simplicity, this paper will use the Euclidean Distance. To determine the optimal number of clusters, we estimated the stopping rule based
on Calin´ski and Harabasz (1974) pseudo-F index.
5Table A1 found in the Annex shows the optimal number of clusters based on Calin´ski and Harabasz (1974).
6The subsequent analysis does not include Belize, given that its IIR data is available only for 2013-2015.
7Measured by the control of corruption index from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators.
8Quantified by the economic complexity index from the Atlas of Industrial Complexity constructed by the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard.
The index extrapolates the value added of exports to a measure of industrial complexity for the country.
9Approximated by per capita Gross Domestic Product.
10Approximated by credit to the private sector as % of GDP.
11The formal test results are
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Figure 4: Relevance of Factors Between Clusters to Improve IIR
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in group 1 (relative to group 2) seems to be oﬀset by greater financial depth and a more complex 
productive structure. On the other hand, the institutional strength of both clusters seems similar. 
The countries of Cluster 3 exhibit credit valuations above those of group 2, despite having 
higher public indebtedness. This greater capacity to tolerate debt is associated with greater insti-
tutional strength, measured by control of corruption, rule of law, accountability, safety, and trans-
parency. Group 3 also has a more diversified productive structure. 
TABLE 2.1  Statistical Summary (Averages in % of GDP, Except Where Otherwise Indicated)a
Indicator Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRb 36.9 40.0 74.3 76.7
Debt 49.4 23.9 32.1 83.8
Balance Currente Account –4.6 –1.7 3.8 –0.3
Tax Burden 30.0 25.0 34.5 40.1
Complexity –0.3 –0.6 0.7 1.0
Depth 47.8 37.5 75.8 191.9
Integration –44.9 –30.3 21.3 –26.4
Control of Corruptionb –0.5 –0.6 0.7 1.2
Source: IDB staﬀ with data from Institutional Investor Magazine and the International Monetary Fund (2014).
Note: 
a “Tails” were eliminated in each indicator (per cluster) to avoid outliers’ eﬀects.
b Index
TABLE 2.2 Relevance of Factors Between Clusters to Improve the IIR
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Source: IDB staﬀ. 
* Low correspond to a statistical significance between 10% and 15%, Medium between 5% and 9.9%; and High between 0% and 4.9%.
Table 1: Statistics Summary 2010-2015 (Mean in % of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Institutional Investor Rating 31.3 26.4 69.7 75.6
Debt (% of GDP) 74.5 34.2 30.0 76.4
GDP Per Capita 6,498.0 3,095 26,317 32,464
Inflation* 5.8 6.0 2.7 1.9
Corruption** -0.3 -0.7 0.4 1.1
Credit to Private Sector 49.0 29.9 74.0 90.9
Source: Elaboration with data from the Institutional Investor Rating, Inter-
national Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2016) and World
Banks (Worldwide Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators, 2016)
* Inter annual variation
** Value index from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best)
When comparing Clusters 1 and 2, we find that both have a similar perception of credit quality, in spite of the fact
that the second group has significantly lower debt levels than the first. When analyzing the structural characteristics, it
is clear that the higher level of debt in group 1 (relative to group 2) seems to be offset by greater financial depth and a
more complex productive structure. On the other hand, the institutional strength of both clusters appears to be similar.
The countries of Cluster 3 exhibit credit valuations above those of group 2, despite having higher public indebt-
edness. This greater capacity to tolerate debt is associated with greater institutional strength, measured by control
of corruption, rule of law, accountability, safety, and transparency. Group 3 also has a more diversified productive
structure.
Finally, when comparing groups 3 and 4, we observed the importance of structural factors in the perception of
credit quality. Both groups have similar credit rankings despite the higher average levels of debt of group 4 (30% and
76% of GDP, respectively). This suggests that investors appear to be incorporating in their valuation of credit quality
6
greater institutional strength, higher GDP per capita, and a more diversified productive structure of the countries in
group 4.
Transitional Dynamics
The next question we explore is if the data reveals something about dynamics. In Latin America we tracked some
interesting cases: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. These countries belonged to Clusters 1 and 2 during the 1990s
(see Figure 5).12 From 1997 onward, these countries began to implement fiscal consolidations and structural reforms
Figure 5: The IIR And Credit Ratings 1990-2015, Selected LAC Countries
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which have enabled them to achieve more solid fundamentals now, allowing them to gain access to international debt
markets at relatively low rates.13 Currently, all four are considered investment grade and are in Cluster 3 of our
classification. Though not synchronized, the trajectory of these three countries toward Cluster 3 showed the same
pattern. Initially they focused on actions in the fiscal sphere, implementing measures such as financial responsibility
legislation, debt ceilings, and debt management, which constrained the level of public debt. While their fiscal positions
improved, reforms were gradually incorporated to strengthen institutions and the financial sector (see Table A2).
The combination of debt reduction and structural improvements enabled them to respond successfully to the last
international crisis. Although the four countries increased spending, and therefore their debt ratios, their respective
credit rating did not deteriorate at all and, in some cases, improved.14
Cracking the Secrets Behind the Debt Intolerance
About the Framework
There are a number of problems with the traditional approach to estimating the debt intolerance equation. First there
is a possible endogeneity of regressors (debt, inflation and default) to the dependent variable (IIR), which may lead
to biased estimates of the coefficients. Reinhart et al. (2003) recognize this and use instrumental variable estimations
with the same general results as their original estimation. However, there are several pitfalls in their approach. Firstly,
there may be endogeneity of IIR groupings (clubs) when these are based on partitions of the dependent variable (as
12We draw hypothetical cluster borders, however each country was either in cluster 1 or 2 during late 1990’s.
13The reduction in financing costs could be attributed to at least two factors: (i) better creditworthiness and (ii) low international interest rates, a
product of the recent expansive monetary policies in developed countries.
14Mexico’s case includes the issue in 2013 of a Perpetual Bond in the markets. At the same time, a set of second and third generation structural
reforms were approved, which led to an improvement in creditworthiness.
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opposed to the more traditional dummies based on partitions of independent variables.) They may also be correlated
with the error term, resulting in biased estimates of the coefficients. Second, any static cross-section estimation does
not take into account changes in the IIR and debt over time and a linear relationship between IIR and debt may be
restrictive. Third, estimations based only on either external debt or domestic debt might offer partially robust results,
while a broader definition that includes domestic debt (i.e. general government debt) might give a better picture of the
importance of debt levels for debt intolerance. Much of these critiques were addressed in Bannister and Barrot (2011),
but we complement them by selecting clusters based on fundamentals through a dissimilarity criterion and enrich the
estimation by analyzing non-linearities among macroeconomic fundamentals.
Our sample includes 120 countries, developed and developing, from 1989 to 2015, an unbalanced panel, except for
the last 15 years that are fairly complete. To eliminate noise, and following standard practice, we take 4- year averages
over 6 periods and one of three years (1989-1992 -4 years; 1993-1996 - 4 years; 1997-2000 - 4 years; 2001-2004- 4
years, 2005-2008- 4 years, 2009-2012- 4 years, and 2013-2015- 3 years). We first describe the methodology and in
the next section we discuss the results.
Methodology
Our canonical model is constructed on the basis of the specification proposed by Bannister and Barrot (2011), expanded
to include main economic fundamentals. The baseline equation that we estimate is thus:
IIRi,t = ρIIRi,t−1 + αi + z
′
i,tβ1 + x
′
i,tβ2 + εi,t, (2)
where IIRi,t is the institutional investors rating and xi,t is a measure for economic fundamentals. zi,t corresponds to
the set of controls in Bannister and Barrot (2011): i) a dummy for periods of inflation over 10 percent, ii) a dummy
for periods of debt restructuring or default, iii) the ratio of debt to GDP, and iv) we also introduce a trend variable to
capture time-specific effects. Finally, we introduce the lagged value of the IIR on the right hand side of the equation
to capture the persistence of the level of the IIR over time. Intuitively, the past evaluation of creditworthiness/debt
intolerance should have a large bearing on the current evaluation.
Furthermore, to gauge the degree of correlation between the variables of institutional strength, the Kaufman World
Wide Governance Indicators were taken into consideration and submitted to a decomposition of principal components.
As can be seen in Table A2, around 75% of the information is accumulated in the first two components, with the priority
distribution as indicated there.15
Measurement of the effects by clusters. We proceed to investigate the relation between the IIR and debt by
controlling for the clusters we defined previously. To do so we created dummies based on the imaginary lines dividing
each cluster. For instance, to generate the dummy indicating cluster 1, we first created a dummy assigning 1 when the
debt ratio was high - debt dummy(d)-, and then a dummy that assigns 1 if IIR is high- (i). With these set of dummies
we carried out the following kxj (k,j=2) estimations:
IIRi,t = ρIIRi,t−1 + αi + z
′
i,tβ1 + x
′
i,tβ2 +
(
iji,t ∗ dki,t
)′
β3 + εi,t. (3)
Expanding with non-linearities.Previously we performed a series of t-tests on mean differences to get a sense of
their significance. The test results gave us some grounds to believe that there might exist non-linear effects between
them. To corroborate this, we carried out a series of estimations, including interaction between debt and fundamentals.
IIRi,t = ρIIRi,t−1 + αi + z
′
i,tβ1 + x
′
i,tβ2 + (debti,t ∗ fi,t)
′
β3 + εi,t. (4)
Estimation method. Since a specification of fixed effects in a dynamic panel is involved, various methods are
15We used the the relative weight of each factor to select those factors to be included in the estimations.
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explored, among them the Fixed Effects, Least Squares, Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). As
a greater number of countries than periods are available, the instruments option in a Generalized Method of Moments
results in more consistent estimations, and therefore we will focus our attention on the Arellano-Bond and Arellano-
Bover outputs. We performed some checks to validate the use of each model, including the Arellano-Bond AR(1) test
for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification restriction in the Arellano-Bover; they are all reported in
the annex.
But You Don't Live on Debt Alone
Economic Fundamentals Really Matter
Tables 4-24 present results for a set of panel estimations using OLS, fixed effects, the Arellano-Bond, and Arellano-
Bover. As in Bannister and Barrot (2011) we have dropped countries with an IIR below 25, as they usually do not
have access to private international debt markets. Regardless of cutting off these countries, our sample size remains
sufficiently large, at circa 300 observations. To briefly recap, the estimation uses a panel of four-year periods between
1989 and 2015. We now proceed to discuss our results.
Table 4 shows the basic panel regression using the set of variables as in Bannister and Barrot (2011). Tables 5-8
correspond to the estimations of equation (2). Their coefficients in the estimation are significant and of the expected
sign. The coefficient on the lagged IIR is positive circa 0.18 with Arellano-Bond and 0.3 with Arellano-Bover, both
suggesting a significant degree of persistence in the IIR. Coefficients on inflation and default variables are negative
and the coefficient on per-capita GDP is positive as expected. The coefficient on the debt ratio is negative proving
that, on average, higher debt has a negative effect on the perception of creditworthiness. As shown in Table 5 and 6,
the negative correlation between the IIR and debt remains of similar magnitude as we expand the controls. All but
GDP per capita share this pattern. Interestingly, GDP per capita becomes larger as we run incremental regressions.
For instance, in the baseline case the coefficient is 0.19 and 0.17 in Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover, respectively.
However, after adding financial depth, control of corruption, and economic complexity, the level jumped to about 0.5
in both estimation methods. We included credit to the private sector as a measure of financial depth. This variable
resulted in a positive and significant coefficient, signaling the recognition that creditworthiness improves, the more
a financial system is robust. Economic complexity renders a similar result; it contributes significantly to a more
optimistic judgment regarding credit quality.
We proceed to answer if the debt tolerance of a country is closely related to the cluster where they are located. We
estimate equation (3) or equivalently a per cluster procedure. First, we show in Table 9-12 the same set of controls as
baseline. In general they keep the same patterns as in baseline regarding the sign when significant. In, both Arellano-
Bond and Arellano-Bover estimations, cluster 1s´ default dummy was redundant as all countries had a default episode
in every one of the 4-year groups. Cluster 2 resulted in a positive coefficient for default; however, its significance
was near zero. Furthermore, we observe two important features: i) persistence of the IIR increased in all but cluster
3, and ii) the linear effect of debt seems to be more negative for cluster 3 followed by cluster 4, which is somewhat
unexpected. The latter finds a correction once we expand the estimation to include other fundamentals. We therefore
continue by adding them one by one. The immediate results are that the negative effect of debt is usually higher
as we approach the lower clusters, supporting our hypothesis of debt tolerance (see Tables 11-13). All of the other
core controls had the same sign as in baseline when significant. In both estimation methods, GDP per capita seemed
to be positively relevant for countries found in clusters 2-4. Inflation turned out to be significant for cluster 2 and
default for cluster 3 and 4. These results have the direction and significance that we would expect: In countries with
relative low debt and low creditworthiness, factors such as financial sector improvements or the absence of inflationary
episodes are used by creditors to assess the chances to repay debts. Moreover, for countries in the locus of cluster 3
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and 4, inflationary episodes are less likely to affect creditworthiness. On the other hand, defaulting would be the main
element for which the markets punish credit quality, in all groups.
Lastly, the other economic fundamentals were mostly significant, conditional on the cluster to which they belonged.
Not surprisingly, financial depth is positively correlated with credit quality in cluster 2 and 3. Both cluster 1 and 4
are weakly correlated-above 10%-, although for different reasons. In cluster 1, financial depth is too low to have any
link with credit quality. Cluster 4 is the opposite pole: since most of its members are already financially developed it
makes no difference to the changes in the IIR. Complexity rendered a positive correlation, as we expected. However,
it was significant only for clusters 3 and 4 with Arellano-Bond and for clusters 2-4 with Arellano-Bover. This is an
interesting finding, in the sense that a diverse export structure is effectively correlated with more tolerance. This result
must be internalizing the expected balancing effects that a more diverse matrix of exports has during shocks. As for
the level, complexity seems to contribute more to countries in cluster 2 followed by country 3 and 4.
And What About Indirect Effects?
So far we have found the existence of a direct inverse relationship between debt and creditworthiness. The second set
of findings is the relevance of economic fundamentals, albeit conditional on the stage of progress - or cluster- they
inhabit. Previously, we mentioned the possibility of non-linear effects between clusters, or, in other words, indirect
effects that are not being properly identified through a linear expression. We now proceed by placing special attention
on the indirect effects originating from improvements in economic fundamentals.
In Equation (5) the marginal effect of the debt ratio on the IIR is determined by
dIIRi,t
ddebti,t
= β3 + β4xi,t, (5)
where we would expect β4 to have a positive sign given the positive spillovers that economic fundamentals might
have on debt financing. The results, shown in Tables 19-24, indeed suggest that the observed distinctions between
fundamentals among clusters are reflected in the differentiated effects that debt has on creditworthiness. For instance,
in both Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover, financial depth reduces the negative effects of debt on IIR (see Table 19
and 22). The pattern is clear: as before, cluster 1 and 4 see no significant gains. Regarding clusters 2 and 3, the lower
the cluster the larger the positive spillovers from increasing financial depth. Our proxy for institutional strengthening,
control of corruption has a similar positive and significant effect (see Table 20 and 23), although it is statistically valid
for the four clusters. Complexity turns out to be also relevant for the four clusters. The level of impact is about the
same for all clusters, except number 2, which is usually higher (Table 21 and 24). These sets of results present some
evidence that the overall effect of changes in debt to GDP ratio are both conditional on the stage of development and
action to improve economic fundamentals.
Wrapping up cluster by cluster:
• For the countries in Cluster 1, each reduction in debt equivalent to 1% of GDP produces, on average, an increase
of about 4% in the creditworthiness index (IIR). Controlling for other fundamentals, the positive effects of
reducing debt increases from 1% to about 7%.
• For the countries in Cluster 2, the sensitivity of the IIR to changes in the level of indebtedness is similar. In
this group, debt cuts of 1% of GDP improve creditworthiness by 5%, falling to about 4% once controlling for
economic fundamentals.
• In Cluster 3 countries, the creditworthiness index rises, on average, by 15% when debt is adjusted by 1% of
GDP. However, this estimate reduces when controlling for other factors. In fact, as can be calculated from the
information in Table 2, the marginal effects per year would fall to about 3%. This suggests that, compared to
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previous cases, the relative importance of other factors, such as institutional quality and the development of the
financial system, is greater.
• Finally, in Cluster 4, the estimations show that the sensitivity of the IIR to changes in the debt is even smaller:
for each point of GDP adjustment in debt, as we control for other factors the IIR increases even below 2%.
Table 2: Probability of a Cluster Change
Cluster in the Next Period
1 2 3 4
Cluster 1 73.80% 15.70% 7.90% 2.60%
in 2 22.20% 65.30% 12.50% 0.00%
Current 3 5.30% 2.10% 81.00% 11.60%
Period 4 3.40% 0.00% 18.60% 78.00%
Table 3: Marginals Effects of Debt on IIR
Control of Nonlinear Credit to Nonlinear Complexity Nonlinear
Baseline Corruption Control of Private Credit to Index Complexity
Corruption Private Sector Index
1 0.165 0.31 0.26 + 0.10 ∗ CC 0.27 0.06 + 0.05 ∗ CPS 0.31 0.42 + 0.004 ∗ COM
2 0.220 0.16 0.15 + 0.43 ∗ CC 0.17 0.38 + 0.07 ∗ CPS 0.17 0.40 + 0.009 ∗ COM
3 0.620 0.12 0.15 + 0.05 ∗ CC 0.11 0.29 + 0.04 ∗ CPS 0.08 0.25 + 0.004 ∗ COM
4 0.290 0.12 0.04 + 0.01 ∗ CC 0.08 0.09 + 0.002 ∗ CPS 0.01 0.39 + 0.005 ∗ COM
Note: Economic Complexity as defined by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009).
According to our results, in cluster 1 the indirect effects of strengthening institutions would also be accompanied
by a larger direct impact from debt reduction on creditworthiness. It is cluster 2 that proves the main winner of these
kind of policies. They would increase the positive direct effect of debt on credit quality but also will receive much
more credit for their improvement. Rather than only benefiting countries in cluster 2, financial improvements are
normally associated with better payoffs for cluster 2 and 3. Under both controls, cluster 4 seem to have a similar
level of marginal effect. Contrastingly, with the above results, economic complexity is associated with mostly indirect
positive effects.
Paving the Road Towards Better Credit Quality?
For policymakers it is important to assess the transition from a lower to a higher creditworthiness. Evidence presented
here suggests that both controlling debt and making some progress with economic fundamentals would provide a path
towards a better cluster and credit quality. But how easy is it for a country to move from one cluster to another?
To progress with this we tracked the different transitions, as we did to generate Figure 5, and calculated a transition
matrix. Using the transition matrix (Figure 6),16 we observe the following:
• Clusters 1 and 2: As seen in Table 1, countries in Cluster 1 and 2 are not, on average, very different in their
structural indicators. The countries of cluster 1 have a higher tax burden, as well as slightly better control of
corruption. However, the greater difference between both clusters is their debt levels. In this regard, the average
country of Cluster 2 has 60% less debt than the average in Cluster 1.
16Four-yearly observations are used to historically evaluate in which cluster a country is found in one period,compared to the cluster in which it
was found in an earlier period.
11
Given that this is the only important difference between the variables in the exercise, the average country of
Cluster 1 could gain access to cluster 2 and improve its credit rating by adjusting its debt.17 Indeed, given that
changes in fiscal indicators could be seen as short-term ones compared to the other fundamentals, the transition
between cluster 1 and 2 is more common than the majority of other transitions between clusters (see Figure 6).
• Clusters 2 and 3: transition between Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 is more costly and takes longer, because structural
changes have direct results in the medium or long term. To move between Clusters 2 and 3, fiscal changes would
not seem to be sufficient by themselves. To achieve the objective it would also be necessary to carry out a series
of important adjustments in the level of integration, productive structure or control of corruption, or in all the
indicators at the same time.18
• Clusters 3 and 4: As for the transition between clusters 3 and 4, we observe a similar pattern to that of clusters
1 and 2. For example, a transition from Cluster 3 to Cluster 4 is more probable (11.6%) than one from Cluster 3
to 2 (2.1%). This is because the average country in Cluster 3 has a series of solid structural indicators and debt
tolerance is greater than in Cluster 2. Indeed, given that the average country in Cluster 4 has a debt of 91% of
GDP, it would be possible to cross from cluster 3 to 4 with a near tripling of debt. This implies that once Cluster
3 is reached, structural variables become fundamental when the time comes for “graduation” to Cluster 4.19
Implementing policies aimed at improving economic fundamentals usually takes time, although there can be short-
term benefits. For example, long processes of political dialogue are often needed to shape reforms and the subsequent
institutional adjustments for their implementation. However, although implementation can take time, the legal formu-
lation of these reforms can yield short-term benefits, since it might create positive expectations on future economic
performance.
The next section explores the different options that the authorities in CAPDR might want to consider, including
structural measures that could have positive effects on investors’ credit perception. We also examine debt adjustment
policies combined with policies geared toward strengthening structural areas of the economy.
Pending Tasks in CAPDR
On the basis of the results obtained from the estimations we discuss two scenarios for CAPDR. In the first, the only
instrument of adjustment is the debt, while there is no other change in any of the economic fundamentals. The second
scenario involves a combination of policy measures, including debt adjustments and measures aimed at improving
fundamentals. We begin by identifying the locus of CAPDR countries. Figure 7 show the 2010-2015 clusters with
CAPDR and some selected countries of LAC.
For Cluster 2 countries, such as Honduras, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, implementing policies
focused on debt reduction, in conjunction with improving institutions and financial system would yield important
benefits. In the first scenario, in which there is no structural improvement in the economy, lowering the debt by 1% of
GDP yearly, would lead to an yearly average improvement in the creditworthiness index of 5%. If, on the other hand,
actions are taken that improve economic fundamentals (for example by climbing up by one position in the ranking of
each one of the structural variables), the effect of a debt adjustment would at least double.20 21 It is worth highlighting
that for this group of countries, improving control of corruption would yield the highest benefits. Thus, implementing
17This does not imply that improvement in the structural indicators would not help to make the transition more rapid
18These pattern has been observed in other success stories in Latin America.
19This does not imply that a deficient handling of the fiscal accounts cannot take a country from cluster 3 to 2.
20This change assumes that the value of the indexes for the other countries remains unchanged.
21It is important to remember that the adjustment would have to be carried out in a period of 4 years.
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Figure 6: Clusters, Sample 2010-2015
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measures in the countries in the region that would improve this indicator22 such that they reach todays´ average for the
Latin America, could yield an increase near to 20% in the IIR.
In the particular case of El Salvador, a country which lies in Cluster 1, under scenario 1 creditworthiness would
improve about 4% for each 1% of GDP adjustment in debt. This change by itself has a lower yield than that for
the other countries in the region, which belong to Cluster 2. In addition, the impact on the IIR of accompanying the
fiscal adjustment with improvements in structural factors such as the indicator of financial sector depth or improving
institutions (so that the country climbs by one position in the ranking for each indicator23) is above 18%.24
In Panama’s case, besides the positive effects which debt reduction entails, improvements in transparency and rule
of law would contribute to raising the country’s credit rating. Panama is the only CAPDR country in Cluster 3, with a
low level of debt and high (investment grade) credit rating and, unlike the rest of the countries of the region, it has a
deep financial system. Yet it shares some of their deficiencies, such as a low level of industrial complexity and weak
institutional indicators. The country should press ahead with reforms to preserve its privileged position and be able to
draw closer to the countries of Cluster 4. Bad public debt management or a deterioration in economic fundamentals
could lead to scenarios in which a fall from investment grade could happen. Therefore, in the absence of improvements
in fundamentals, an increase in debt of 1% of GDP would be reflected in a worsening of creditworthiness by 15%.
However, if Panama continues to improve its economic fundamentals the country may see credit quality improving
circa 10%. 25 the negative impact on creditworthiness would be of 0.6%.
Evaluating the results for the CAPDR countries, it is clear that setting guidelines for short- and long-term actions
would benefit the region. While in the short term reductions in public debt would improve creditworthiness, the
creation of a medium and long-term agenda to improve fundamentals would translate into higher credit ratings, which
would be reflected in a transition, for example from Cluster 2 to Cluster 3. In summary, better fundamentals would
allow access to financing at lower rates. In the future, besides counting on debt reduction as a policy instrument, the
CAPDR agenda ought to be capable of identifying which medium and long-term structural measures would offer the
highest returns.
22In this exercise Costa Rica is excluded given that it is above the Latin American average for control of corruption.
23Maintaining constant the value of the indicators for other countries.
24The gains from structural reforms are lower in the cluster to which Nicaragua belongs than for the cluster to which the majority of CAPDR
countries belong.
25As before, assuming unchanged the value of the indicators for all other countries in LAC. The change is from current position to the LAC
average.
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Conclusions
The analysis of this chapter suggests two types of policy measures for CAPDR countries. First, it is reasonable to begin
with quick gains26 on the fiscal side, given the greater return they generate on the IIR and their immediate impact. This
type of fiscal action could also build confidence to facilitate subsequent areas of change for the longer term. However,
it is important not to neglect measures specifically aimed at improving medium and long-term fundamentals, which
could have positive short-term effects through their impact on expectations. That is, it is recommendable for CAPDR
countries to simultaneously emphasize progress in debt reduction policies and improvements in institutional quality,
the productive structure and the financial sector.
Second, the successful implementation of a program of fiscal and more structural measures could, after a time,
enable the country to “graduate” from a particular type of cluster. In any case, countries of the region would most likely
need to increase their creditworthiness from their current level in order to shift to a better composition of fundamentals.
In return, governments would be able to achieve a larger fiscal space at lower cost in periods of consolidation while,
in times of crisis, they would enjoy greater response flexibility.
With focused efforts, CAPDR countries could achieve targets for consolidation and higher credit quality. Although
the agenda of plans and measures to be implemented is broad, the region has improved many of its key points [I14]and
today is in a better position than it was in the 1990s. The steps taken by other Latin American countries, such as
Chile, Colombia, Mexico or Peru, offer possible guidelines to follow. The CAPDR region has major strengths which,
channeled in the right direction, provide opportunities for the development of its economies.
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Annex
Table 4: Debt Intolerance Regression Outputs a la Bannister et al (2011)
Ordinary Fixed Arellano Arellano
Least Squares Effects - Bond - Bover
IIRt−1 0.860∗∗ 0.529∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.444∗∗
(37.48) (12.47) (5.49) (12.42)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.0769+ -0.326∗∗ -0.422∗∗ -0.311∗∗
(-1.92) (-5.60) (-7.28) (-5.34)
Debt (% of GDP) Squared 0.0000404 0.00139∗∗ 0.00154∗∗ 0.000826+
(0.13) (3.37) (3.64) (1.87)
Inflation (Dummy) -2.075∗ -2.351∗ -1.411 -2.495∗
(-2.39) (-2.38) (-1.51) (-2.51)
Default (Dummy) -3.993∗∗ -3.073∗ -1.679 -2.942∗
(-3.97) (-2.50) (-1.45) (-2.46)
GDP Per Capita 0.0000879∗∗ 0.0000298 0.0000866+ 0.000358∗∗
(3.27) (0.66) (1.92) (9.78)
Trend -1.124∗∗ 0.201 1.011∗∗ -0.762∗∗
(-6.26) (0.75) (4.11) (-4.04)
Constant 18.95∗∗ 40.37∗∗ 57.23∗∗ 45.49∗∗
(10.52) (14.61) (22.20) (18.34)
Observations 346 346 283 346
Adjusted R2 0.954 0.610
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Linear Effects of Fundamentals: OLS
Base Incremental 1 Incremental 2 Incremental 3
IIRt−1 0.692∗∗ 0.650∗∗ 0.645∗∗ 0.642∗∗
(27.82) (23.11) (22.74) (22.83)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.0530∗∗ -0.0526∗∗ -0.0556∗∗ -0.0465∗∗
(-4.41) (-4.35) (-4.50) (-3.66)
GDP Per Capita 0.0605∗∗ 0.0571∗∗ 0.0487∗∗ 0.220∗∗
(7.39) (6.94) (4.45) (3.41)
Default (Dummy) -0.144∗∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.141∗∗ -0.134∗∗
(-6.16) (-6.10) (-6.01) (-5.73)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0560∗∗ -0.0341+ -0.0317 -0.0249
(-2.91) (-1.70) (-1.57) (-1.23)
Trend -0.0262∗∗ -0.0255∗∗ -0.0224∗∗ -0.0195∗∗
(-6.62) (-6.38) (-4.65) (-3.99)
Credit-Private-Sector 0.0436∗∗ 0.0417∗∗ 0.0422∗∗
(3.24) (3.08) (3.15)
Control of Corruption 0.0148 0.0309∗
(1.17) (2.23)
Complexity 0.0103∗∗
(2.69)
Constant 1.082∗∗ 1.097∗∗ 1.187∗∗ 0.454
(14.65) (14.76) (11.10) (1.56)
Observations 346 335 335 335
Adjusted R2 0.945 0.944 0.944 0.945
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Linear Effects of Fundamentals: Fixed Effects
Base Incremental 1 Incremental 2 Incremental 3
IIRt−1 0.457∗∗ 0.596∗∗ 0.433∗∗ 0.433∗∗
(13.49) (20.25) (12.62) (12.57)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.100∗∗ -0.0607∗∗ -0.0889∗∗ -0.0885∗∗
(-4.94) (-4.55) (-4.46) (-4.39)
GDP Per Capita 0.157∗∗ 0.0708∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.143
(5.40) (7.49) (4.50) (1.64)
Default (Dummy) -0.0933∗∗ -0.140∗∗ -0.0919∗∗ -0.0920∗∗
(-3.51) (-5.87) (-3.55) (-3.55)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0329 -0.0369+ -0.0203 -0.0198
(-1.52) (-1.84) (-0.95) (-0.92)
Trend -0.0262∗∗ -0.0258∗∗ -0.0207∗∗ -0.0203∗∗
(-3.60) (-6.70) (-2.82) (-2.60)
Credit-Private-Sector 0.0572∗∗ 0.0586∗ 0.0593∗
(3.85) (2.53) (2.50)
Control of Corruption 0.162∗∗ 0.161∗∗
(4.41) (4.40)
Complexity 0.000781
(0.14)
Constant 1.310∗∗ 1.164∗∗ 1.263∗∗ 1.216∗∗
(4.55) (14.26) (4.52) (2.83)
Observations 346 335 335 335
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.688 0.687
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Linear Effects of Fundamentals: Arellano-Bond
Base Incremental 1 Incremental 2 Incremental 3
IIRt−1 0.244∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(7.11) (4.98) (5.29) (4.19)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.152∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.132∗∗
(-6.61) (-6.95) (-6.55) (-6.06)
GDP Per Capita 0.193∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.574∗∗
(5.81) (5.14) (5.15) (5.65)
Default (Dummy) -0.0653∗ -0.0675∗∗ -0.0618∗ -0.0525∗
(-2.38) (-2.58) (-2.44) (-2.09)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0388+ -0.0665∗∗ -0.0581∗∗ -0.0484∗
(-1.77) (-3.08) (-2.76) (-2.33)
Trend -0.0198∗ -0.0231∗∗ -0.0174∗ -0.00969
(-2.50) (-2.97) (-2.28) (-1.25)
Credit-Private-Sector 0.126∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.144∗∗
(4.65) (4.52) (5.40)
Control of Corruption 0.156∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(4.12) (3.70)
Complexity 0.0251∗∗
(4.17)
Constant 1.989∗∗ 1.968∗∗ 1.877∗∗ 0.249
(6.12) (6.34) (6.23) (0.52)
Observations 283 272 272 272
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Linear Effects of Fundamentals: Arellano-Bover
Base Incremental 1 Incremental 2 Incremental 3
IIRt−1 0.304∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.226∗∗
(9.64) (7.90) (8.01) (7.07)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.159∗∗ -0.161∗∗ -0.192∗∗ -0.163∗∗
(-9.60) (-9.85) (-10.65) (-8.74)
GDP Per Capita 0.176∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.0825∗∗ 0.542∗∗
(12.11) (7.88) (3.54) (5.33)
Default (Dummy) -0.0526+ -0.0492+ -0.0553∗ -0.0394
(-1.95) (-1.90) (-2.16) (-1.56)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0403+ -0.0629∗∗ -0.0597∗∗ -0.0436∗
(-1.89) (-3.00) (-2.89) (-2.13)
Trend -0.0214∗∗ -0.0176∗∗ 0.00106 0.00429
(-5.26) (-4.23) (0.16) (0.68)
Credit-Private-Sector 0.0926∗∗ 0.0745∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(3.91) (3.12) (4.20)
Control of Corruption 0.100∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(3.79) (4.56)
Complexity 0.0267∗∗
(4.62)
Constant 1.938∗∗ 2.063∗∗ 2.636∗∗ 0.595
(16.56) (17.55) (13.79) (1.25)
Observations 346 335 335 335
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Baseline: OLS Regression by Cluster
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIR t−1 0.726∗∗ 0.745∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 0.789∗∗
(7.21) (11.67) (17.43) (13.31)
Debt (% of GDP) 0.329 -0.0907 -0.193+ -0.0953
(1.00) (-1.44) (-1.73) (-0.70)
Debt (% of GDP) Squared -0.00384 0.000181 0.00106 0.000155
(-1.49) (0.43) (0.75) (0.17)
GDP Per Capita 0.0000829 0.000231 0.000161∗∗ 0.000112+
(0.93) (1.04) (4.73) (1.71)
Default (Dummy) 0 -1.890 -8.214∗∗ -8.795∗
(.) (-1.49) (-3.08) (-2.24)
Inflation (Dummy) -2.598 -2.652∗ -3.345∗ 5.061
(-1.19) (-2.14) (-2.47) (1.26)
Trend -2.078∗∗ -1.173∗∗ -0.298 -0.897∗
(-3.63) (-3.11) (-1.05) (-2.53)
Constant 19.63∗ 19.72∗∗ 27.58∗∗ 24.53∗∗
(2.31) (6.30) (8.26) (4.33)
Observations 39 80 125 102
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.809 0.941 0.912
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: Baseline: Fixed Effects Regression by Cluster
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.726∗∗ 0.745∗∗ 0.662∗∗ 0.781∗∗
(7.21) (11.67) (15.29) (12.76)
Debt (% if GDP) 0.329 -0.0907 -0.194 -0.140
(1.00) (-1.44) (-1.62) (-0.99)
Debt (% if GDP) Squared -0.00384 0.000181 0.000990 0.000355
(-1.49) (0.43) (0.67) (0.37)
GDP Per Capita 0.0000829 0.000231 0.000162∗∗ 0.000112+
(0.93) (1.04) (4.31) (1.65)
Default (Dummy) 0 -1.890 -8.446∗∗ -9.049∗
(.) (-1.49) (-3.14) (-2.35)
Inflation (Dummy) -2.598 -2.652∗ -3.643∗ 4.551
(-1.19) (-2.14) (-2.57) (1.13)
Trend -2.078∗∗ -1.173∗∗ -0.210 -0.836∗
(-3.63) (-3.11) (-0.73) (-2.36)
Constant 19.63∗ 19.72∗∗ 29.14∗∗ 26.94∗∗
(2.31) (6.30) (8.10) (4.56)
Observations 39 80 125 102
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Arellano-Bond Regression by Cluster
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.527∗∗ 0.204+ 0.0962+ 0.256∗∗
(4.62) (1.69) (1.66) (3.82)
Debt (% of GDP) 0.163 -0.187∗ -0.839∗∗ -0.602∗∗
(0.45) (-2.05) (-6.42) (-4.22)
Debt (% of GDP) Squared -0.00385 0.000645 0.00682∗∗ 0.00211∗
(-1.35) (1.09) (4.36) (2.16)
GDP Per Capita 0.000377+ 0.000577 0.000129∗ 0.000215∗∗
(1.87) (1.06) (2.39) (2.61)
Inflation (Dummy) -2.371 -2.908∗ -1.566 0.794
(-1.02) (-2.00) (-1.07) (0.24)
Trend -1.905∗∗ -0.117 3.581∗∗ 2.565∗∗
(-2.60) (-0.20) (8.10) (5.25)
Default (Dummy) 0.0755 -8.588∗∗ -6.728∗
(0.05) (-3.58) (-2.57)
Constant 35.51∗∗ 30.88∗∗ 65.47∗∗ 82.04∗∗
(3.40) (8.10) (15.43) (11.93)
Observations 32 64 103 84
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: Arellano-Bover Regression by Cluster
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.520∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.367∗∗ 0.583∗∗
(5.81) (3.51) (6.33) (8.16)
Debt (% of GDP) 0.165 -0.216∗ -0.625∗∗ -0.291+
(0.49) (-2.46) (-4.46) (-1.76)
Debt (% of GDP) Squared -0.00379 0.000764 0.00506∗∗ 0.000697
(-1.42) (1.29) (2.94) (0.60)
GDP Per Capita 0.000372∗∗ 0.000452 0.000249∗∗ 0.000209∗∗
(3.49) (1.26) (5.80) (2.92)
Inflation (Dummy) -2.333 -3.512∗ -3.144+ -4.174
(-1.14) (-2.52) (-1.86) (-1.03)
Trend -2.178∗∗ -0.577 0.480 -0.579
(-3.78) (-1.40) (1.51) (-1.59)
Default (Dummy) -1.082 -11.46∗∗ -5.122+
(-0.68) (-4.44) (-1.66)
Constant 36.69∗∗ 31.48∗∗ 51.86∗∗ 46.79∗∗
(3.96) (8.37) (11.59) (6.98)
Observations 39 80 125 102
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Arellano-Bond by Cluster Including Control of Corruption
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.597∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.323∗∗
(6.06) (2.63) (5.07) (5.78)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.355∗∗ -0.0528 -0.103∗∗ -0.167∗∗
(-4.26) (-0.79) (-3.85) (-5.60)
GDP Per Capita -0.0651 0.254∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(-0.55) (2.94) (5.53) (2.81)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0452 -0.0822+ 0.0133 0.0296
(-0.94) (-1.65) (0.42) (0.61)
Control of Corruption 0.152 0.249∗ 0.0313∗ 0.0812∗
(1.45) (2.50) (2.47) (2.02)
Trend -0.00653 -0.0364+ -0.00989 -0.00265
(-0.21) (-1.68) (-1.01) (-0.32)
Default (Dummy) -0.00444 -0.243∗∗ -0.138∗∗
(-1.09) (-5.75) (-3.33)
Constant 3.566∗∗ 1.214 1.690∗∗ 2.414∗∗
(3.38) (1.54) (4.35) (5.83)
Observations 32 64 103 84
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14: Arellano-Bond by Cluster Including Credit to Private Sector
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.647∗∗ 0.120 0.215∗∗ 0.383∗∗
(6.84) (1.31) (4.91) (5.19)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.355∗∗ -0.112+ -0.104∗∗ -0.176∗∗
(-3.77) (-1.93) (-3.74) (-5.84)
GDP Per Capita -0.0302 0.215∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(-0.24) (2.21) (4.61) (3.04)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0447 -0.126∗∗ -0.00110 0.0619
(-0.88) (-2.77) (-0.04) (1.07)
Credit-Private-Sector 0.0493 0.230∗∗ 0.0641∗ -0.0596
(0.71) (2.92) (2.00) (-1.43)
Trend -0.0285 -0.0303 -0.00963 -0.00584
(-0.87) (-1.48) (-0.89) (-0.68)
Default (Dummy) -0.0462 -0.238∗∗ -0.138∗∗
(-1.01) (-5.77) (-3.27)
Constant 3.041∗ 1.183 1.772∗∗ 2.417∗∗
(2.58) (1.60) (4.55) (5.66)
Observations 32 62 96 82
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Arellano-Bond by Cluster Including Complexity
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.662∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.265∗∗
(7.45) (2.70) (4.93) (4.88)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.383∗∗ -0.0849 -0.108∗∗ -0.0201∗∗
(-4.41) (-1.21) (-4.30) (-7.06)
GDP Per Capita -0.188 -0.0538 0.844∗∗ 0.665∗∗
(-0.56) (-0.14) (5.88) (5.78)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0459 -0.0721 -0.0434 -0.0241
(-0.91) (-1.39) (-1.45) (0.53)
Complexity -0.00779 -0.0227 0.0382∗∗ 0.0313∗∗
(-0.38) (-0.86) (4.49) (4.95)
Trend -0.0168 -0.0499∗ 0.00853 0.00753
(-0.55) (-2.19) (0.85) (0.90)
Default (Dummy) 0.0146 -0.202∗∗ -0.117∗∗
(0.26) (-5.13) (-2.98)
Constant 3.983∗ 2.136 -0.789 0.515
(2.44) (1.35) (-1.22) (0.95)
Observations 32 64 103 84
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 16: Arellano-Bover by Cluster Including Control of Corruption
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.634∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.410∗∗
(8.34) (3.97) (5.54) (7.69)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.313∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.120∗∗
(-4.73) (-2.80) (-4.82) (-8.54)
GDP Per Capita 0.0435 0.110+ 0.150∗∗ 0.0859∗∗
(0.86) (1.68) (5.21) (3.24)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0403 -0.0904+ -0.00805 -0.00123
(-0.91) (-1.89) (-0.28) (-0.03)
Control of Corruption 0.0880 0.187∗ 0.0274+ 0.0443+
(1.10) (2.00) (1.95) (1.64)
Trend -0.0425∗ -0.0128 0.00264 0.000711
(-2.49) (-0.68) (0.33) (0.11)
Default (Dummy) -0.0302 -0.243∗∗ -0.122∗∗
(-0.60) (-6.30) (-3.39)
Constant 2.538∗∗ 2.229∗∗ 2.232∗∗ 2.506∗∗
(4.86) (3.34) (8.42) (10.98)
Observations 39 80 125 102
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Arellano-Bover by Cluster Including Credit to Private Sector
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.634∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.442∗∗
(8.10) (3.09) (5.03) (6.78)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.277∗∗ -0.177∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.188∗∗
(-3.91) (-3.44) (-4.95) (-8.07)
GDP Per Capita 0.0639 0.136∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.129∗∗
(1.55) (2.39) (5.96) (5.92)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0214 -0.128∗∗ -0.0123 0.0242
(-0.47) (-2.85) (-0.42) (0.43)
Credit-Private-Sector 0.0605 0.119∗ 0.0719∗ -0.0356
(1.05) (2.12) (2.55) (-1.05)
Trend -0.0517∗∗ -0.0172 -0.00157 -0.00852∗
(-3.59) (-1.04) (-0.27) (-2.18)
Default (Dummy) 0.00297 -0.239∗∗ -0.120∗∗
(0.06) (-6.33) (-3.19)
Constant 2.056∗∗ 1.823∗∗ 2.108∗∗ 2.139∗∗
(5.35) (3.20) (10.29) (9.76)
Observations 39 79 117 100
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 18: Arellano-Bover by Cluster Including Complexity
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.662∗∗ 0.358∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.375∗∗
(8.74) (3.90) (5.74) (7.04)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.312∗∗ -0.169∗ -0.0850∗∗ -0.0193∗∗
(-4.45) (-2.57) (-3.86) (-8.89)
GDP Per Capita -0.133 0.202 0.670∗∗ 0.505∗∗
(-0.41) (0.53) (5.08) (4.25)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0315 -0.0873+ -0.0264+ -0.00151
(-0.72) (-1.73) (-1.90) (-0.03)
Complexity -0.0122 0.0602∗ 0.0268∗∗ 0.0198∗∗
(-0.67) (2.25) (3.80) (3.30)
Trend -0.0500∗∗ -0.0222 -0.00512 -0.00770∗
(-3.40) (-1.14) (-1.05) (-2.14)
Default (Dummy) -0.0443 -0.218∗∗ -0.0815∗
(-0.80) (-5.96) (-2.26)
Constant 3.092∗ 1.768 -0.294 0.536
(2.12) (1.06) (-0.46) (0.99)
Observations 39 80 125 102
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 19: Arellano - Bond Regressions by Cluster: Nonlinearity Case 1
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.644∗∗ 0.130 0.230∗∗ 0.379∗∗
(6.99) (1.39) (5.30) (5.12)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.0824 -0.253 -0.298∗ -0.453+
(-0.30) (-1.36) (-2.01) (-1.51)
GDP Per Capita -0.0819 0.203∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(-0.63) (2.03) (4.49) (2.92)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0533 -0.125∗∗ 0.00147 0.0435
(-1.05) (-2.72) (0.05) (0.71)
Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 0.347 0.0401+ 0.114+ 0.286
(1.17) (1.96) (1.84) (1.15)
Credit * Debt -0.0770 0.0492 0.0461 0.0594
(-1.04) (2.82)∗∗ (2.30)∗ (1.93)+
Trend -0.0123 -0.0261 -0.00776 -0.00670
(-0.35) (-1.21) (-0.72) (-0.77)
Default (Dummy) -0.0482 -0.212∗∗ -0.126∗∗
(1.03) (-4.61) (-2.83)
Constant 2.349+ 1.770+ 2.508∗∗ 3.539∗∗
(1.74) (1.67) (3.77) (2.75)
Observations 32 62 96 82
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: Arellano - Bond Regressions by Cluster: Nonlinearity Case 2
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.556∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.323∗∗
(5.66) (2.64) (5.20) (5.74)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.315∗∗ -0.127∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.0727+
(-3.65) (-2.13) (-4.50) (-1.91)
GDP Per Capita -0.0614 0.274∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.106∗
(-0.54) (3.07) (4.29) (2.55)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0496 -0.0787+ 0.0205 0.0275
(-1.07) (-1.58) (0.66) (0.56)
Control of Corruption 0.448+ 0.662∗ 0.0947∗ 0.343
(1.72) (2.65) (2.03) (0.63)
Corruption * Debt -0.0911 -0.102+ 0.0401+ -0.0643
(-1.24) (1.96) (1.86) (0.27)
Trend -0.00510 -0.0389+ 0.000203 -0.00142
(-0.17) (-1.78) (0.02) (-0.17)
Default (Dummy) -0.00758 -0.213∗∗ -0.152∗∗
(-0.15) (-4.73) (-3.53)
Constant 3.527∗∗ 1.368+ 2.060∗∗ 2.110∗∗
(3.49) (1.66) (4.89) (4.39)
Observations 32 64 103 84
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 21: Arellano-Bond Regression by Cluster Nonlinearity Case 3
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.569∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.224∗∗
(5.86) (2.72) (5.06) (4.05)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.483∗ -0.272+ -0.228∗ 0.291+
(-2.23) (1.95) (-2.31) (1.72)
GDP Per Capita -0.0167 0.533 0.789∗∗ 0.691∗∗
(-0.05) (0.94) (5.41) (6.38)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0583 -0.0568 -0.0407 -0.0278
(-1.23) (-1.08) (1.35) (0.62)
Complexity -0.0139 0.0498∗ 0.0404∗∗ 0.0145+
(-0.73) (2.18) (4.59) (1.64)
Complexity * Debt 0.00447+ 0.00638+ 0.00441+ 0.00465∗∗
(1.71) (1.29) (1.24) (2.95)
Trend 0.00377 -0.0343 0.00923 0.0143+
(0.12) (-1.38) (0.92) (1.69)
Default (Dummy) 0.00408 -0.186∗∗ -0.158∗∗
(0.07) (-4.40) (-3.84)
Constant 2.294 -1.314 -0.129 -1.390+
(1.29) (-0.44) (-0.16) (-1.82)
Observations 32 64 103 84
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.12, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Arellano - Bover Regression by Cluster: Nonlinearity Case 1
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.626∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.442∗∗
(7.82) (3.15) (5.47) (6.73)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.0689 -0.379+ -0.294∗ -0.099+
(-0.26) (-1.92) (-2.17) (-1.70)
GDP Per Capita 0.0575 0.130∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.129∗∗
(1.41) (2.21) (6.11) (5.60)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0276 -0.124∗∗ -0.00658 0.0232
(-0.61) (-2.68) (-0.23) (0.38)
Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 0.276 0.163+ 0.100+ 0.0448
(0.98) (1.61) (1.78) (0.19)
Credit * Debt -0.0541 0.0718∗ 0.0451∗ 0.00239
(-0.78) (2.08) (2.34) (0.04)
Trend -0.0470∗∗ -0.0124 -0.00229 -0.00856∗
(-2.98) (-0.71) (-0.41) (-2.12)
Default (Dummy) 0.00779 -0.215∗∗ -0.119∗∗
(0.16) (-5.10) (-2.94)
Constant 1.288 2.600∗∗ 2.717∗∗ 2.183+
(1.28) (2.74) (5.45) (1.87)
Observations 39 79 117 100
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 23: Arellano - Bover Regression by Cluster: Nonlinearity Case 2
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.562∗∗ 0.356∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.397∗∗
(6.85) (4.05) (5.79) (7.38)
Debt (% of GDP) -0.262∗∗ -0.158∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.0429∗
(-3.79) (-2.34) (-5.55) (-2.57)
GDP Per Capita 0.0725 0.111 0.116∗∗ 0.0777∗∗
(1.45) (1.64) (3.73) (2.89)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0527 -0.0821+ 0.00595 0.00987
(-1.25) (-1.69) (0.21) (0.21)
Control of Corruption 0.466∗ 0.193+ 0.105+ 0.491∗
(1.99) (0.39) (-1.59) (2.42)
Corruption * Debt 0.107+ 0.432+ 0.0481∗ 0.0108∗
(1.70) (1.80) (2.23) (2.22)
Trend -0.0421∗∗ -0.0124 0.0129 0.00201
(-2.61) (-0.65) (1.42) (0.30)
Default (Dummy) -0.0316 -0.204∗∗ -0.158∗∗
(-0.62) (-4.90) (-3.98)
Constant 2.370∗∗ 2.174∗∗ 2.562∗∗ 1.977∗∗
(4.70) (2.88) (8.67) (5.97)
Observations 39 80 125 102
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 24: Arellano-Bover Regression by Cluster Nonlinearity Case 3
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRt−1 0.572∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.296∗∗
(6.62) (3.63) (5.87) (5.26)
Debt (% of GDP) 0.4226+ -0.404+ -0.249∗ 0.395∗
(2.00) (-1.53) (-2.54) (2.46)
GDP Per Capita -0.0225 0.926+ 0.609∗∗ 0.547∗∗
(-0.07) (1.92) (4.57) (4.94)
Inflation (Dummy) -0.0479 -0.0654 0.0242 0.0294
(-1.15) (-1.33) (0.83) (0.66)
Complexity -0.0229 0.0163+ 0.0305∗∗ 0.00102
(-1.28) (1.69) (4.08) (0.12)
Complexity * Debt 0.00415+ 0.00968∗ 0.00492+ 0.00547∗∗
(1.75) (2.23) (1.70) (3.70)
Trend -0.0370∗ -0.0148 -0.00426 -0.00571
(-2.38) (-0.79) (-0.87) (-1.62)
Default (Dummy) -0.0461 -0.196∗∗ -0.145∗∗
(-0.87) (-5.05) (-3.69)
Constant 1.607 -3.113 0.552 -1.803∗
(1.01) (-1.16) (0.71) (-2.38)
Observations 39 80 125 102
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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